No. 54

<Objective life-worldly organic experience and the primordial organic experience in its function of founding for an objective world-experience>[[1]](#footnote-1)

*<Content:> Man according to bodiliness, organism and soul as theme of the life-worldly description. Furthermore: transcendental clarification of the psycho-physical givennesses. Regressive inquiry as to the primordial Ego and the functioning, in which world and man constitutes itself.[[2]](#footnote-2)*

<§1. The concrete life-worldly reality “man” in its organic-psychic double-layeredness.

The layeredness of the organism>

Descriptive science is in the widest sense that which remains within the realm (of the open-endless) **life-world**, within the horizon of actual and possible experience, with the conscious goal of bringing that which is experienced as world consequently to an ever more complete, immediate or inductive experiential cognizance, descriptive cognizance. It is directed towards the truth, but truth in constant motion, anticipating, that each achieved truth as being relative lies within a horizon of possible systematic completion, in predelinetaed directions of this completion; and in each shall then the currently realized be more complete, the truer truth, but which implies the former one as simplification, as incomplete preliminary stage. The psychic comes descriptively into consideration as real fact within the universal inductive empiricism. The psychic: Ego-subjects in their conscious life within the empiricism, the subjects through their bodies within the spatio-temporality of mere nature. But prior to modern natural science and its abstract view of nature, organism and soul have already been differentiated thus far that the organism thereby is distinguished as mere body from the Ego, governing “therein”, however it is mythisized. This is the original naïve-mythical dualism.

What enters the specific **psycho-physical empirical** **knowledge**? What does unitarily stand out as spatio-temporally real man, as unity of distinguished layers “organism” and “soul”, concretely unitarily, that is, in inductive correlation, that is, in the widest sense in causal [correlation]?

The question has to be differentiated as to what traditional psychology attributes, and what presents itself actually – life-worldly. The Ego-subject, the person, the subject of the personal life, of the conscious life and of the intentional abilities, takes sensualistic and in general data-psychology as a temporal stream of data, naturalistically <as> a realm of proper simultaneity and successivity, self-contained, with its own forces and laws, but at the same time conditioned in its occurrences through the bodily processes of the organism: The immanent temporality of the psychic being is identified with the spatio-temporality of the bodily organism.

Apart from this sensualism the “soul” indeed has its “localization” within the organism; and the question is, what kind of inductivity <presents itself> within the unitary reality “man” (and “animal”) with regard to the special determinations being proper to it, especially those [determinations] which purely run within the bodiliness (regarded in itself), and to those within the “soul”, again regarded in itself, and then between both kinds of elements.

The body has, purely as a body, an abstract substantiality, its formal structure of the category of properties. As far as this reaches we do not talk of causality with regard to the properties. It only emerges when considering the body among bodies within nature. Causality concerns the body as a substance among substances. Also the “soul”, the Ego-subject, has its essential structure. Does it as something embodied within the world, as soul of this body, have its own substantiality? And [does it have] such a [substantiality] which would enable in a useful way a causality between bodily substance and psychic substance?

Men, psycho-physical. The bodies within bodily nature. The psychic. The personal subjects “united with”, “connected to” the bodies. What constitutes their specifically human, their personal being when they are experienced in the experience as men **[621]** within the spatio-temporal world? What do we find if we simply explicate them?

They are each Ego-subjects, as those [they are] within occupations with objects surrounding them, and immediately with their bodily organism. “Occupations” or: As Ego-subjects they are “intentionally” related to objects, they are centers, poles, but Ego-poles of experiencing cognizances, of acts of comprising, of relating, of comparing, of distinguishing, of the being-affected-emotionally, of the active valuing, of the taking-decisions, <of the> acting – all these ways of behavior towards the things proper to the respective Ego, centered within it, on the other hand affections by the things; but all that according to a respectively developed habituality, ability, for example according to habitual instincts and purposes, interests, within the change not only of these corresponding current intentionalities, but also within the intentional life founding ever new interests and re-shaping existing ones.

I, the psychologist, have the world so to say before me, experience men and their sphere of occupation belonging to the surrounding world within my field of perception, my field of memory, possibly within my current conceptual field of occupation, as being constantly within the world given to me, being certain to me as being, being respectively certain to me without reflection as simply being there, with these men and <these as> occupying themselves with things which are simply there (from me) – certainly sometimes deceiving themselves as to the being and the being thus, but also in that actually <being related> to the world as being (for them and for me, the psychologist).

Man <is> like any object in the world object of actual and possible experience, as that object of an own kind; thus respectively experienced in a horizon not of random, but of bound possibilities being undetermined in advance, but from their kind delimited as universality. Within the unity of the object the properties in which it explicates its being, have a togetherness, they systematically point to each other within the course of the experience; they form a **unity of inner inductivity**. Thus also man. He has a body, which like any other body has an own inductivity being self-sustained in a certain way, that is, an own “substantiality”. But **the man, taken in a concrete way, is a substance**. The bodily substance, that is, the body here as unity of its bodily **[622]** properties, is a dependent element, in its persisting being and being thus [it is] an element of the persisting being of the man as the peculiar real belonging to the spatio-temporal world: Like anything real it is in advance apperceived in its type and with an ultimate horizon of its possibilities as something real in the world –within the horizon of its “region”.[[3]](#footnote-3)

The experiential sense of the things ever more shapes itself for the experiencing Ego within the course of life as undermost always experiencing. The thing as that, insofar as it is repeatedly experienced and recognized as identically the same, unintentionally thereby becomes ever better known, and thus any thing which repeatedly enters the circle of experience. But by way of apperceptive transference each same or similar thing receives a closer determined horizon, more richly predelineated, and eventually in such a way that all things of a region are connected through the highest similarity (as overlapping within a highest universality).[[4]](#footnote-4) Thus enriched, the regional horizon determines itself more closely. The theoretic goal to get to know the world as such in its most universal, in its regional, is not only actualized analytically by way of clarification of that which is respectively predelineated within the horizon; it is still open as determining itself ever further and closer through possible experience.[[5]](#footnote-5) Experiment and observation, that is, an experiment which could presumably and possibly evidently be carried out with any similar thing, result in a farther reaching knowledge as such of the world itself as world of possible experience – and on top of that a closing thought initially creating in a hypothetical way.

How about the theme “man in general”? He has a body. But the regional universal “man in general” does not imply body in general, it has to be an **organic body**. Neither does this universality suffice – it is a **specifically human organism**: Thus it is pre-theoretically *a priori* already pre-given within human experience.

The experiential science of man in bodily regard has the task to explore the human organism, that is, to consequently exert experience of men, in which the reality “man” verifies itself as identical,<and> to enlarge this experience through theory and experiment, that is, in this special task, the physiological one, with regard to the bodily organism, but not as pure bodiliness within a pure abstraction. Since then we would have a physical-chemical regard of the body – without the question as to what it is that within this body of an Ego-subject makes <this body be the body> of **its** subject, and how accordingly the peculiarity of the bodiliness is predelineated from there, that is, which conditionality does rule here, which conditions of the possibility to serve the Ego as an organism the bodiliness as such has to fulfill. Here exactly that which constitutes the “being an organism of a body”, and that which constitutes a human Ego’s being as such which “has” an organism and this as an <organism> of this Ego, is *a priori* guiding.

We encounter here the bodily ruling Ego and the bodily relations to all the other things of the world playing their constant role within all intentional occupations of the Ego. As soon as we experience the organic body as **organism**, we purely constitute a **double-layeredness of the organism** within experience, that is, in all bodily, the bodiliness of which, the objectivity of which is actually experienced within the governing, within the intentionality of the Ego. The organic body now, taken purely as body, is only superficially experienced within experience, one-sidedly, in general with a horizon of experienceability but unacquaintedness, and, only experienced in that way, it is constantly self-given for the awake man who needs to be explored.

His body is constantly there for the man within his awake life, and [it] takes part in everything being there for him. But however changeable the experience of the organism is, in purely bodily regard a one-sided [experience], in incomplete self-givenness of its bodiliness. But the experiencing knowledge of the initially unintuitional and unknown “inner side” of the body can be enlarged, especially in indirect ways (through wounds, surgeries), that is, mainly in hypothetical ways, whereby that which is not experienced is anticipated with a sense, as if it was **[624]** experienceable itself, that is – what really counts – in its function as organism. This hypothetical cognizance of the organism in bodily respect, since it is about organism, means at the same time a presupposition for a farther reaching double-layerdness, that of the governing functioning of the Ego, and in universal regard the presupposition that the bodily organism in its physical-chemical peculiarity necessarily must have such a structure that the universal functioning being experienced within the double-layerdness stretches beyond the actually double-sided experiencing into the anatomical structures, or rather, that the movability, the changeability, which constitutes the double-sided happening of the bodily “life”, reaches into the special structures. The necessary grasping of all organisms as bodilinesses for subjectivities, which of course are only quite indirectly understandable as alterations of the human [subjectivities] eventually results from transference to animal being and eventually to the universal of the organic life-world – initially in complete ignorance about how this alteration could be imagined in a more determined way.

Bodiliness, bodily life is a proper objective (or ”real”) layer within the reality “man”. Directly experienceable for everyone within man –objectively through empathic perception, through perception of something foreign, that is, ”reflexively”. Certainly, <only> one’s own bodiliness is perceived in a completely immediate way, namely by the subject of the organism (in a primordially perceptual way), directly the functioning, one’s own hearing, one’s own seeing, the pushing as bodily function, etc., and correlatively the bodily happening as such, as involuntarily or voluntarily acting happening (objective acting), but also as involuntarily [acting] with the layer giving sense from the Ego. But the being-constantly-ready-as-organ and the being-directly-available in different kinesthetic directions, and for the whole organism the being-able-to-function-together of the organs corresponds to the always already given egoical consciousness of ability. This ability has an open horizon –that of the completion through training, the development of new special abilities due to the old [ability] with its special shapes of systematic movabilities.

**[625]**

Text No. 54

<§2. The primordial, non-objective experience of the organism and of the world, being foundational for objective experience of the organism and of the world>

All this is right. But now it has to be considered that “world” with mere nature and men and animals, with all intellectuality being in the world is the universal title for the all of the <for> anyone experienceable, verifiable, cognizable being. That which I primordially experience as presenting itself to me in actual originality and with a horizon, which I could actually bring to self-presentation originally, perceptually (that which thus does not have any being-sense and mediate experienceability for me on the way via the others and their “messages”), as **something primordial** is in a certain way indeed something objective, identifiable for me, something which can be learned, but [it is] not something **objectively** being. Objectively being is simply experienceable **for everyone**, something directly and furthermore also inductively experienceable in a mediate way. Also the primordial purely taken as such is not a determination of myself as the man objectively being within the world; my human being is experienceable, verifiable, determinable experientially in objective truth as the same by anyone and among them by myself. If the experiencing, thinking, etc. of everyone was a mere next to each other, external of each other, as if – as it is often thought in a naïve way – everyone within the completion of his cognizance, separated from all the others could gain truth (of course objective truth), then certainly my original self-experience, self-cognizance was already objective. But objective experience is simply communalized experience, or rather, experience within the horizon of actual and possible communalization within the experiencing; It is objective only by my having already a horizon of fellow subjects in advance, of whom I have a possible experience (but in the form of foreign perception, which presupposes my primordial self-perception as not yet being objective, but as subjective function within foreign perception). But by being certain in advance, as soon as I investigate sense as man and scientific man, of the horizon of subjectivity functioning with each other and together with me, and by experiencing **the world as world for all**, each experience, which I make myself from my original self-experience, has already the **sense of the co-[626] experienceability in foreign experiences**, in which others understand me in my self-own being and my primordial givennesses. **My original organism** (<as well as> the things of my perceptual sphere given in primordial originality) gain and have always gained from there the **extended sense**: “The same which I experience primordially as organism, is that which the other understands afterwards within the connection with me as thing and organism, as something primordially experienceable by me (being objectively someone else for him and given as someone else), within the limitedness of the primordiality.”

If I abstract from others, then my organism indeed has a horizon in primordial self-experience, but [it has] such a horizon that it is inconceivable to ever find within it that which I could already find at the bodies external to me in proceeding actual experience, and even to find that, which only through open infinity of fellow subjects was to be found in mutually connected experience and induction. **World** <and> **nature have their whole sense with relation to this infinity**; this is evident at least for the one being focused theoretically. In this connection creating a sense, continuously extending the objective sense, I myself – I as a subject approachable for all fellow Ego – become **objective**, and then within the only conceivable way of an objective bodily Ego, the organism of which presents itself to me in self-perception, and now with a horizon which can only find its experiential fulfillment through common experiential and mental life. And each man as objectively being within the spatio-temporal world accordingly has the **objective egoical property** (as “psychically” belonging to him), **that he is within the world as something experiencing the world** and that as that he has a **primordial aspect** of the world and with that an experiential horizon related to other men, and especially, that everyone has a **primordial experience** of his organism, being **foundational for all objective experiences** he can make, <and> that he alone has an original intuition of the organism as sensually functioning, since this subjective functioning, and together with that the most original sense of “organism”, “organ”, “sensually perceiving”, etc. is the presupposition for experiencing the other ones, and this again [is the] presupposition for an objective experience with the sense of objectivity, i.e., being experience, which within the connection **[627]** with others can become communalized [experience] verifying (or rather correcting) itself within communalization. But this “can” is not just an empty possibility, but rather it is an evidence which constitutes the natural evidence of the world being for the experiencing one with regard to its being a matter of course.

These exhibitions make the philosophizing Ego wonder. It will have to say to itself: I am certain of the objective world without any doubt, and also of the fact that I am within the world, a real man among the “realities”, the “substances” within the world. But “objectivity” means “to be experienceable, cognizable, verifiable as something being for all”. But all – the horizon of the others -, initially any single other ones, are still there for me only through foreign experience; but this is founded on an original self-grasping, which cannot yet have the sense of an objective [self-grasping]. I am original for me; and the self-certainty lying herein with all evidently experienced therein as being (purely being for me) is the reason for acceptance for all objectivity , or the **“purely” subjective being <is> the ground of being for the objective being**. My primordial being, into which also all my empathies as original givennesses of my pure being belong (as its mental processes), is the reason for acceptance of the others’ being, - the primordially lived empathies, but not as mental processes of my stream of mental processes, but as my acceptances of being, or my mental processes as intentional acts, <as> positing intentional objects: I posit [that] I accept them now, and I accept them in a way which has its kind of verification. This being of others as the being of “other Egos”, which like me are absolute subjects of their primordialities, then is the presupposition of objectivity, the presupposition for the being world, and therein the being men. Every man is objective as being for any other Ego being accepted by me and verifying itself – and every [man] objectively apperceiving and secularizing by way of these acceptances and their verifications (which belong to him). Accordingly we have universal objectivity, world as all of the objectively being, related back to a non-objective subjectivity as horizon of subjects functioning in connection with me – functioning by way of any [subject] having its own functioning primordial organism (and its other Ego-subjective life, doing, thinking, acting, etc.), and any [subject], functioning in immediate communalization with the others effects the common performance of the objective world as world of the everyday common experience, as world in its proper movability <and> relativity of acceptance, changing according to subjects, special communities, historicities.[[6]](#footnote-6)

And at last, this functioning all-subjectivity is what it is for me, the philosophizing Ego, and it is for me from my primordiality of the absolute life and performance, from my foreign experiences, from my verifications of the same, in which I mediately bring into acceptance and verify the experiences and performances of the foreign ones. I am within my primordial purety – as transcendental Ego – the absolute ground for the transcendental Ego-all and the absolute carrier of acceptance and carrier of the reasons for acceptance for all that which is, which I can address as being.

<§3. The functioning together of bodily part-functions lacking outstandingness within the unity of an action and the improper localization of the fields of sensual sentiments as well as of all subjective being spatialized>

We will leave aside now the transcendental consideration inquiring back as to the absolute foundation of cognizance and being.

We go back to the simple, straight focusing on the world and to the question, which objective “components” the objective experience makes distinguishable at the single man and in the universality of the region at the men as such. We have there clarified from purely objective experience the objective, which is called “organism” there. Its primordial core has taken over an objective sense. It has as body its universal objective determination being possible as at other bodies, whereby that which objectively bestows an **organism** to it is out of question. It belongs to its objectivity that the layer of significance, put onto the body by me (the primordial Ego in a concrete sense, the **[629]** eventually functioning Ego), is experienceable by everyone as a way of activity, or rather, ability for activities (objectively as actions) – in such a way that everyone can understand man thus far as kinesthetically governing, <as> he immediately perceives this <governing>, but at the same time with the horizon of the others understanding him by experiencing, and also within the communalizing of the experience which is verifiable and correctable <and> also is to be completed. At first the completion results from **apperceptive extension**. While understanding the happening of the foreign organism in its “mental” layer also experiences which have been made with one’s own organism are extended; thus the experiences of different men will and will in general create an enlarged horizon of possible experience and verification of the experience of the organism’s happening by way of communalizing.

Within the absolute, purely original sphere the functioning happens within the organism in different **organs** becoming already prominent within the bodily layer; and <in> the special ways they function they stand out, initially with the help of the way that organs function while now keeping still, now within the action of the “motion”. While **functioning together** the partial functions fuse, and then often lack outstandingness. (Thus we will for example be certain that almost all organs otherwise often functioning on their own need to interact, if we go and lift a cabinet and the like.) But how the single functions thereby are distributed within their respective determination – in their own layer, we cannot see, we have not unified them by adding in single random acts. Within the unity of a will a **unity of corresponding kinestheses** is conscious, and this undistinguished unity also is only [conscious] within **transition** (<e.g.> in the direction of our goal to lift the cabinet and move it there).

Of course an analysis can already begin here, and a general essential description of the kind of connection of the single functions to undistinguished fused unities. And this without practicing a specific Ego-reflection on the acting Ego possibly involuntarily reacting to stimuli, whereby this involuntary reacting, like breathing, is a subjective doing, an **[630]** instinctive [doing]. One can hold one’s breath. That which one can hold is egoical, since <holding> is differentiated from a paralysis conditioned in a purely physical way, similar to a subjective motion of the hand, be it voluntary or involuntary, needs to be well distinguished from an objective motion of the hand being shoved from outside or even the motion of being driven by car. Of course the theme of the **organism’s sensuality** **towards stimuli** of the different kinds and genres of sentiments is a special theme belonging here, whereby the concept of sentiment still has to be gained as a purely bodily one through the intentional analysis of perceptions, their reduction to primordiality. The **fields of sensual sentiment** (essential basic layers for the possible presentation of objective bodies and thereby of a world as such) are the objective content of the organisms as organisms, layers of the human organisms objectively grasped as bodies and at the same time <as> organisms.

But it should never be forgotten here that this already pre-scientific-life-worldly unity of experience “man”, as that in which the organism is a body at the same time, and <which> at the same time from the Ego has layers of sensual fields and of kinestheses belonging to it, and of the also objectivated givennesses being connected with these, **is a unity in which only the body has actual spatio-temporality**, whereas <that> subjective for example which is piled up, and thereby is spatialized and temporalized, is only improperly localized within space and time and bodiliness.

The objective experiential unity of the body and of that which is improperly localized at it and within it, especially within the sensuality of touching (within the layer of the tactile sensations, in order to prefer a more objective expression) leads to a **confusion**. On the surface of the bodily organism the sensations extend, they spread into single tactile sensations possibly standing out in them –like point and figure on a piece of paper. But it would be absurd to regard the tactile field of sentiment as a spatial shape, like it would be absurd to search within space for facial fields of sentiments.

I must also not overlook that the perspectives standing out within an analysis (which has never been exerted in psychology) of the perceptual phenomena, <the> subjective ways of the changing intentional presentation of experiential objects, result within the change of focus on objects and on a subjective presentation like **[631]** lying on the object and thus localizing themselves, and [that] in this way and for the different sensualities determinations of the organism and determinations of the body – and this for the bodily organism itself and for other bodies – combine in different ways, purely phenomenologically.

Appendix L

<The kind of my body’s being constantly present in all bodily world experience>[[7]](#footnote-7)

Furthermore.[[8]](#footnote-8) If I now begin making the bodily nature within my perceptions (perceptual appearances), current perceptions or recollections as my past perceptions, etc. the **constitutive theme of experience**, namely to ask for the multiplicities of actual and possible experiences – aspects -, in which it presents itself synthetically-univocally, I soon have to notice, that I cannot do this without thereby at the same time taking **my organism** and thereby **my human-subjective** into the constitutive theme, through which “my body” is a body functioning in the way of an organism, in one word “organism” and initially organ and system of organs for all my perceptions. The perceptual appearances, the experiencing of all worldly being for me, are something subjective, in which something “objective”, worldly, “presents” itself to me.

Or rather: Whereas in ont<ic> direction of regard my organism appears as a body among bodies (only limited in certain ways within the change of its ways of appearance), also this [organism] is a content of the appearing world (and ont<ically> belonging to nature which appears in it). That experienced nature as being experienced (as a whole and according to all special experiential objects) is only thereby present for me, only thereby presents itself in respective appearances, that my organism, that its “perceptual organs” respectively “**function as organs**”, this holds true for my bodily organism itself, and its single organs – these regarded in a purely physical way. If for example my hand shall appear perceptually this is only possible if thereby at once other organs “function as organs”, **[632]** e.g. <if> the other hand or also and normally at the same time the eyes, etc. function, function as touching, seeing, etc. that hand. Of course I am initially inclined to posit the way of my organism’s constitution of appearance as body, but then also to bring into the theme this in relation to itself and all bodies functioning-as-organism, as-organ.

If I ask what this **functioning** means, that is, how I come to realize, <what> is the specific of the organism as such, that is, of the organism as presenting itself to me, then I see that I indeed arrive at a new kind of “subjective” which goes beyond the self-presentations of true bodilinesses and also of those of my own bodiliness. The functioning of the organism, and,which is in question here, its functioning as organ of all bodily perception, is **my** functioning being active and being affected.[[9]](#footnote-9)

Ont<ically> I have as pure experiential objectivity – independent of my paying attention to it or not, insofar as it <presents itself> in the way of appearing only within the appearing givenness of the world – **no appearing physical object**, **without my being present “in person”** as somebody seeing, as somebody hearing, touching, etc.[[10]](#footnote-10) This implies beyond the mere spatial being together “there” (appearing together within the same appearing field of space- and body-thing) a surplus. Ont<ically> my **organism** is not only its “There” like that of another body, but as “my” body it is an **organ**, **”whereby I”, “wherein I” am acting and suffering**, <it> is something being in a quite singular and proper way. **I am myself “embodied” as Ego under the title “my body”**, [I am] one with this appearing organism-body, and not only is there in this or that moment something like a “psychic” doing or suffering – and one time this, another time that – given as placed onto the body appearing as continuously being identical. Rather “I” am given as **something distinguished** from each body and also from this body (my organism), but as being **one** with this body, as an Ego remaining one with the remaining self body. But I am in a special way, if this body is given as functioning perceptually – and necessarily it is present wherever I have been given any body purely as being experienced, as functioning perceptually for it -, **Ego of this organism**, I myself, the one functioning perceptually “within” it. For instance at each point of my **[633]** bodily surface, which constantly appears to me as a whole**, I sense** –and in a special way, where I experience that another body touches my organism in a bodily way, and [where] I then experience, that “**I am touched**” tactually sensing, whereby the being touched means a new “egoical” in contrast to the spatio-bodily continuous adjacence, the bodily touch in another sense. And if I exert a textile perception, like touching with the finger, then I have at the same time <on the one hand> the motions and touching of bodiliness presenting themselves within the physical appearances of the touched thing and of the touching finger, and on the other hand as egoical side my continuous, egoical (kinesthetic) moving and touching, but both continuously in one.

Thus it is with all perceiving, even if in different ways in the different modes of the touching, seeing, etc. This means: The organism as constantly functioning in a perceptual way ont<ically> has a **double-sidedness**, in which the Ego is ont<ically> present, that is, in a constant way of “function”, being constantly unified with the constant bodily layer appearing in an ont<ic> way. The Ego is here ont<ically> so to say incorporated into the body, which is called “my organism” there.

Organism as experiential phenomenon, as presenting itself as organism in its way, has two sides: a bodily side and an Ego-side. Like the bodiliness is presented in manifold ways of appearance as something identical (a self appearing in manifold ways); thus the Ego as embodied Ego is a self appearing in manifold ways, but in totally different ones; and both in a continuous unity is the phenomenon “my organism”. As that it is now present at everything which generally appears as being bodily, or I <am> present. Thereby respectively functioning in special ways I, the bodily Ego, am, having “within” and “through” the respective organs the respective appearances of the perceived body, and bringing them into play by freely acting, bringing [them] into an intended process. Here the togetherness of activity and passivity needs to be described more closely, and above all also the “ability” belonging to the Ego as perceiving in a bodily way, which in advance is apperceptively taken into the ont<ic> givenness “organism”. The organism as my organism, as that of my lasting Ego, is what it is, as embodying within itself my **lasting ability**,<e.g.> the ability, to direct my eyes within the familiar systematic field of my “possible” eye-movements in a random way thus and thus, and to thereby randomly look “here and there”, and to thereby randomly direct the visual perceptions which I currently have of my body in such a way that I am able to get sight of the perceived after not having seen it, or [that I] am able to see it “more concisely”, “more closely” after having seen it already.

**[634]** This already hints at fields of required deeper descriptions with regard to the structure of the bodily appearances and the structure of the egoical processes and the egoical abilities belonging to the identity of the Ego.

But that which initially mattered to me that is to exhibit the peculiarity of the ont<ic> phenomenon “my organism” as perceptual organ, and to make visible thereby that in inseparable unity with experienced nature, that is, the ontic universe of the respective perceptual bodilinesses, also always something co-perceptive and worldly appears as the Ego (I myself), that is, “animating” Ego presenting the bodily organism, the only organism presenting itself, embodied within it under the title “my organism”: The body in which I am in a functioning way, carrying kinesthetic movability, sensitivity within itself, and thus has connected a new kind of subjective co-opinion as co-experience in each physical perceptual appearance, according to which it is then experienced ontically as a body standing out, as being experienced expressing <or> presenting and thereby localizes in itself a non-physical layer of experience. But this in a respective certain way and thus, that this determination is correlative to the process of the physically experienced appearances of all bodies in general, and that respectively they are only body-experiences as being motivated (as “apodosis”) by the respective bodily situation in their specific layer, functioning for the corresponding appearances and respectively being determined contentually. Accordingly all body-experiences, bodily appearances are dependent – apodosis -; as apperceptions and in their syntheses they are constant elements within the unity of a concrete apperception, simply in their apperceptive combination with that which under the title of **function** is subjective in the sense of “egoically governing with the organism”, which further connections would then have to be pursued more closely in this direction.

All that serves the clarification of the “possibility of experience” of a nature;[[11]](#footnote-11) experience taken <as> “having” nature in appearances as appearing.

If I now proceed in order to explore the men the way they are self-given within man-experience, that is, in their experiences as my “appearances” of them, then I take notice of an essential difference implied therein in such a way that I as a man perceptually appear to myself, and the way that all the others appear to me: It is clear that indeed their bodies actually **[635]** appear to me perceptually, and thus present themselves in my experiencing physical aspects, but actually not their psychic, and at least that which constitutes the specific of their perceptual organism, let alone their other subjective: the appearances they have, the world aspects being theirs, and as that belonging to their subjective sense.

How thus do I experience other men as persons, as psychic realities? Here “empathy” as content of the experience of these men becomes an issue, and thus the whole apperception “man”, whereas I already have at my disposal the explication of my body’s self-experience, and of the original sphere of my subjective of the title “my perceptions of random bodies”, and possibly of the proper subjective furthermore being connected with it like “I am thinking”, “I feel”, “I wish”, etc.

But I also notice then that my world experience, and initially <my> physical world experience is not merely that of my originally own perceptions and modifications of perceptions, but that I **use as well** the others being for me (being for me in the way of the experience of empathy), and that the accordance of the experience of nature, in which for me the being of nature in unbroken actuality, which continuously verifies itself, is not merely the <accordance> of my own experiences, but, that is, for me, also that kind of accordance, taking into account the others’ experiences having become available for me. I notice that nature thus in advance is **nature for everyone**, having been accessible for everyone with the same sense and the same content of being. Thus the clarification of the foreign experience itself also belongs to the <clarification of> the constitution of nature as being mine, but which for me is objective nature. On the other hand the task at the same time is to clarify men and then animals as objective realities, as unities of appearances; and it becomes more complicated by men and animals being also constituted for me as harmonious unities of experience, that is, of my experiences (whereby the experiences with regard to the psychic have the character of “appresentations” being performed within me of the peculiar form of ”empathy”), and yet at the same time as harmonious experiential unities of the experiences of all experiencing [subjects].

I thus have to show how my empathizing experience of others results in these other ones, as performing themselves empathies, and physical nature as already experiencing themselves, and thus all worldly which is originally there for them, and that thereby necessarily their experienced and my experienced is evidently cognizable as world with the help of the medium of my empathy as being related to the same world, to the same respective things, but also to the same men, whom I, performing immediate empathy, have been given, **[636]** and whom they have been given according to the experience I gain from this having-been-given as empathizing ones.

Thus proceeding the tasks accrue to clarify the being-for-each-other, being-with-each-other, but also <the> communicating-with-each-other, communalizing, forming-social-unities, and likewise to clarify the **humanizing of the world**, it’s fitting out with experiential products of a higher level as products of a meaning being humanly ascribed to them, which any experiencing [subject] of the same closer or more distant communalization can “see” in them, and which everyone can then verify from his place.

The single subjective and intersubjective communalized subjective ways of appearance are in question in all these considerations of the world as correlate of the “experience” – statically! -, in which “world”, the same world, the same things of the surrounding world, present themselves “perceptually”.

1. 12th June 1936. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. [Sic!] [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. But this is <an> open horizon (see below). Thus “region” [is] an idea designed in theoretic experience. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Concerning „region“. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The latter already in advance by way of consulting foreign experiences – intersubjectively. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. As to the critique of psychology this results in: Self-perception is only objective if it is not „pure“ self-perception, but also has from me along with its experiencing the experiential horizon of experienceability for others by way of foreign perceptions (empathies), simply as perception of my being, as Ego-man. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. October, November 1931. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. The first part of the manuscript is printed above as appendix XLI. – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. On the next three pages something for further explication: VIII-X <= page 632.14-634.4 German edition> (good). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. The kind of my body’s being constantly present in all bodily experience of the world. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Of the **static** issue, in which we are always initially standing. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)